Argumentative Discourse as a Sign by van den Hoven, Paul
University of Windsor
Scholarship at UWindsor
OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 8
Jun 3rd, 9:00 AM - Jun 6th, 5:00 PM
Argumentative Discourse as a Sign
Paul van den Hoven
Utrecht University
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been
accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please
contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.
van den Hoven, Paul, "Argumentative Discourse as a Sign" (2009). OSSA Conference Archive. 73.
http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA8/papersandcommentaries/73
 
Hoven, P. van den (2009). Argumentative Discourse as a Sign. In: J. Ritola (Ed.), Argument 
Cultures: Proceedings of OSSA 09, CD-ROM (pp. 1-9), Windsor, ON: OSSA. 
Copyright © 2009, the author. 
 
Argumentative Discourse as a Sign 
 
PAUL VAN DEN HOVEN 
 
Utrecht Institute of Linguistics 
Utrecht University 
Muntstraat 2A 
3512 EV Utrecht University  
The Netherlands 
p.vandenhoven@uu.nl 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper discusses the text format of judicial and semi-judicial decisions. That format does 
not optimize comprehensibility. It should be understood as a sign that  symbolizes an ideology. It 
symbolizes the values of an inevitable decision that follows from the facts and an a priori given coherent 
and complete legal system. The narrative text format with it stylistic features is also a very welcome 
instrument to hide the moments that this ideal is impracticable. 
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1. THE FORMAT OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
 
Bhatia (1993) claims that judicial decisions have a typical four moves structure: 
identifying the case, establishing the facts of the case, arguing the case and pronouncing 
the judgment. Arguing the case has three sub-moves: stating the history of the case, 
presenting arguments, deriving ration decidendi. Davide Mazzi (2007) analyses a corpus 
of English and Irish judgments and a corpus of EC judgments in which he discovers 
relatively similar structures. In a scheme: 
 
House of Lords/Ireland’s Supreme Court Court of Justice of the EC 
 identifying the case 
 establishing the facts of the case 
 arguing the case 
o stating the history of the case 
o identifying the conflict of 
categorization 
o presenting the arguments 
o deriving the ratio decidendi 
 pronouncing the judgment 
 identifying the case 
 identifying the scope of proceedings before 
the Court 
 retrieving the relevant Community and/or 
national legislation 
 stating the history of the case 
 arguing the case 
o arguments of the parties 
o arguments of the Court 
 settling costs 
 pronouncing judgment 
 
 
I have analyzed (a) a broad sample of decisions of different judicial courts, (b) a sample 
of 30 decisions of first instance criminal courts (Van den Hoven & Plug 2008), (c) a 
sample of over 60 decisions of semi-judicial institutions (decisions of a local social 
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security appeal committee, decisions of the Netherlands Competition Authority, decisions 
of the Dutch Data Protection Authority). The texts under (c) were analyzed to prepare for 
interventions within these institutions. During these interventions—in the form of two- or 
three-day seminars—text formats, argument structures as well as the stylistics of the texts 
were extensively discussed with the actual writers (which are often not the same persons 
as the formal decision makers). In all cases mentioned under (c) and in part of the cases 
mentioned under (a) the files were available that show concept versions, comments of 
seniors, comments of the formal decision makers; these files provide a detailed insight in 
the conventions, the tactics and sometimes also in the process of socialization of new 
writers. 
These analyses of Dutch judicial and semi-judicial practices show similar 
structures as the ones Bhatia and Mazzi found. However, the texts show minor variations. 
Stating the history of the case is sometimes an element that stands relatively apart from 
arguing the case, mixed with the facts. Especially in the decisions of the appeal 
committee a very long history of the specific client is often incorporated at the beginning 
of the text. In Dutch law court decisions we usually do not find a separate part in which 
the relevant legislation is retrieved. But in texts of the Dutch Data Protection Authority 
we do find this element very extensively. Formal judicial decisions have an explicit 
speech act of pronouncing the judgment, while semi-judicial decisions tend to draw just a 
conclusion from the arguments, without repeating this as an explicit declaration. Some of 
the semi-judicial institutions present the text as an appendix of a formal letter; this is not 
done in the court decisions. And so on. These variations exist mainly between the sub 
corpora, not within the sub corpora. Within the sub corpora the homogeneity on the 
macro level and in micro stylistics is staggering, even where the variance of writers’ 
quality on the micro level is large. So the preference for these structures seems to be 
unrelated to writing skills. 
All formats have in common that the first part of the text focuses on the facts. 
Texts start with an identification of ‘factual’ elements of the particular case. All texts end 
with the decision. The presentation of the arguments (arguing the case) is always 
between the facts as the opening stage and the decision as the last stage. This 
macrostructure tends to repeat itself in the heart of the argumentation. There we see again 
a preference for a presentation order: arguments—conclusion. A presentation order 
standpoint—arguments is rare.  
The texts also share a high degree of repetition and paraphrases. This seems to be 
a consequence of the macro structure. Because the facts and (optionally) relevant 
legislation are first separated from the presentation of the arguments, there is a need to 
repeat these facts and a (paraphrase of) the applicable legal rules in the actual 
argumentation.  
 
2. EXAMPLES 
 
I will present some examples to illustrate these observations. The examples are authentic 
but are made unrecognizable. In the translations the Dutch word order is followed rather 
directly. The first text is a typical example of the findings of an official investigation of 
the Dutch Data Protection Authority. The Dutch DPA supervises the compliance with 
acts that regulate the use of personal data, such as the Personal Data Protection Act. This 
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law regulates under which conditions personal data may be gathered, stored and 
distributed. Here a so called ‘social’ website, addressed mainly to minors, is investigated. 
Formally this text does not entail a judicial decision, although its conclusions can be the 
ground for a legal enforcement. The text is presented as the supplement to a one page 
letter that states that the investigated practice is unlawful and refers to the supplement. 
The last sentence of this letter is: 
 
(1) In het bijgaande rapport heeft het CBP aangegeven welke maatregelen noodzakelijk worden 
geacht. 
In the attached report the DPA has indicated which measures are considered necessary. 
 
This sentence shows some of the typical features that we see time and again on the micro 
level of (semi-)judicial texts. Measures are considered necessary. On crucial moments 
the agent of interpretative and evaluative acts (to consider) is hidden, even though in the 
sentence this agent (CBP) is explicitly present as the agent of non-interpretative act (to 
attach). 
The supplement starts with a heading Description of the facts established on the 
basis of a copy of the website, followed by Legal framework (Juridisch kader), Judgment 
(Beoordeling) and Conclusion. The first three headings have subheadings, but the 
subheadings of the Legal Framework have no clear relation with the subheadings of 
Judgment. This reveals that the structure of both sections is functionally unrelated. Most 
facts and rules are repeated in the section Judgment—the heart of the argumentation - 
although not literally. So the macro structure is not functionally utilized. It symbolizes a 
logic: facts—rules—judgment, but actually it is filled in as: series of ‘facts’—series of 
structurally unrelated rules—structurally unrelated paraphrased selection from these 
facts and rules in an argument structure. 
We will quote two short passages from the Judgment section. Passage (2) typically 
illustrates how the macrostructure is copied in the heart of the argumentation: facts—
rule—(conclusion). In (3) we find a very frequent hybrid order: rule—facts—‘broad’ 
argumentative indicator—conclusion - facts. 
 
(2) X heeft na ontvangst van de voorlopige bevindingen zijn firmanaam en vestigingsadres 
bekend gemaakt in de privacyverklaring. Hiermee voldoet X echter niet aan het bepaalde in 
artikel 33 Wbp, zoals uitgewerkt in de richtsnoeren, om naast zijn naam en vestigingsadres 
ook een elektronisch contactadres te vermelden. 
After receipt of the provisional findings X has published his company name and address in the 
privacy statement. By this however X does not satisfy article 33 Personal Data Protection Act, 
as worked out in the directives, to publish besides his name and company address also an 
electronic contact address. 
(3) Artikel 6 Wpb schrijft voor dat persoonsgegevens in overeenstemming met de wet en op 
behoorlijke en zorgvuldige wijze dienen te worden verwerkt. […] Vaststaat dat X zich 
expliciet richt op de kwetsbare groep van jongeren tussen de 10 en de 15 jaar. Van jongeren 
onder de 16 jaar kan niet worden aangenomen dat zij goed in staat zijn om de consequenties 
van hun acties te overzien. Kinderen zijn inherent kwetsbaar, met een nog niet volledig 
ontwikkeld vermogen om zelf keuzes te maken. Gelet op het vorenstaande handelt X in strijd 
met het bepaalde in artikel 6 nu hij geen rekening heeft gehouden met het feit dat alleen de 
wettelijk vertegenwoordiger toestemming kan geven voor een minderjarige.  
Article 6 Personal Data Protection Act prescribes that personal data should be processed in 
accordance with the law and in a proper way. […]. Established is that X explicitly addresses 
the vulnerable group of young people between 10 and 15 year. Young people under 16 can 
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not be expected to take in all the consequences of their actions. Children are inherently 
vulnerable, with a not yet fully developed ability to make choices themselves. Considering the 
above-mentioned, X acts in violation with what is prescribed in article 6 now that he has not 
taken in account the fact that only the legal representative can give permission for a minor. 
  
Fragment (3) illustrates some of the standard micro features. Subjectivity markers are 
avoided, no indication is given of the specific agent voice (the CBP): Established 
is …Young people under 16 can not be expected to…X acts in violation….  
The second example comes from a criminal judgment. The text follows the 
standard format for this type of decisions: identifying the case, the trial, indictment, 
evidence, punishability of the fact and the offender, motivation of the penalty, applicable 
sections of the law, decision. I quote from the motivation of the penalty to show how it 
uses the facts—(rules)—conclusion format, as in all thirty cases that were examined 
(compare Van den Hoven & Plug 2008). 
 
(4) Verdachte is samen met zijn zoon naar iemand, van wie hij meende nog geld tegoed te hebben, 
toegegaan en heeft toen hij in het huis van het slachtoffer was hem samen met zijn zoon 
verbaal bedreigd teneinde een geldbedrag afhandig te maken. Dit mislukte omdat het 
slachtoffer geen geld in huis had. Wel is het verdachte gelukt om onder bedreiging van een 
stofzuigerstang het slachtoffer zijn mobiele telefoon te ontfutselen. [meer feiten]. De 
rechtbank rekent verdachtes gewelddadige handelwijze bij de afpersing en de poging daartoe 
ernstig aan. Daarbij is van belang dat dit soort feiten niet alleen de slachtoffers grote schrik 
aanjaagt en nog lange tijd gevoelens van angst en onzekerheid met zich mee zal brengen, 
maar ook in de samenleving leidt tot gevoelens van onveiligheid en angst. Voorts overweegt 
de rechtbank dat de strafbare feiten gepleegd in de relatiesfeer een grote inbreuk maken op de 
integriteit en de privacy van het slachtoffer. Het vorenoverwogene brengt de rechtbank ertoe 
een gevangenisstraf [van 15 maanden] op te leggen. Teneinde verdachte te stimuleren 
vrijwillig iets aan zijn alcoholverslaving te doen alsook om hem ervan te weerhouden in de 
toekomst strafbare feiten te plegen, zal de rechtbank een deel van de straf voorwaardelijk 
opleggen. 
Accused went together with his son to the house of someone who he thought owned him 
money and when he was in the house of the victim, he together with his son has intimidated 
him in order to do him out of a sum of money. This failed because the victim had no money in 
his house. But accused succeeded by intimidation with the pipe of a vacuum cleaner to diddle 
the victim his mobile phone. [more facts]. The court reckons heavily the accused’s violent 
method during the extortion and the attempt to it. With that, it is not only relevant that these 
kind of facts strike great terror into the victim but also causes feelings of unsafety and fear in 
the society. Further the court considers that the punishable facts, committed in the private 
sphere, infringe strongly the integrity and privacy of the victim. The considerations above 
bring the court to sentence to an imprisonment [of 15 months]. In order to stimulate accused 
to voluntary do something about his alcoholism as also to prevent him to commit crimes in the 
future, the court will impose part of the punishment suspended. 
 
A reader will understand that the mentioned facts are claimed to be relevant for the 
judgment that 15 months is an adequate punishment. However, the rather undetermined 
argumentative indicators (with that …, further … and  the considerations above bring …) 
leave aside what precisely the relations are between the explicitly stated argumentative 
utterances and the conclusion. This is a rather systematic feature of the preferred 
argumentation—conclusion format. A precise reconstruction of the unexpressed premises 
that are part of the argumentative responsibilities of the writer is very hard to make 
because no specific and precise argumentative indicators are used. This is in fact a copy 
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on ‘micro’ level of the phenomenon we observed on the level of the macro structure. The 
structure suggests a (deductive) logic, but actually does not fulfill this suggestion. 
The last example comes from a local appeal committee for decisions concerning 
social security. The macrostructure of this decision on a petition is: the disputed decision, 
matter in dispute, minutes of the hearing, case history, judgment of the dispute, decision. 
Because these cases are appeal cases we see a more explicit dispute in the macrostructure. 
The client got social security money, found a job, did not or too late inform the social 
service, had to pay back part of his welfare money and was also fined a certain amount of 
money. His protest concerns the fine. I quote and translate word by word part of a 
passage that illustrates several of the micro features that we systematically observe in the 
used formats. 
 
(5) De belanghebbende heeft op grond van artikel 
65 de rechtsplicht om desgevraagd of uit 
eigener beweging aan burgemeester en 
wethouder alle relevante informatie te 
verschaffen waarvan hij weet, of redelijkerwijs 
kan weten, dat deze voor het recht op bijstand 
van belang is. In het algemeen mag worden 
verwacht dat aangetoond wordt dat de 
verstrekte informatie juist en volledig is. […] 
Uit de stukken is duidelijk geworden dat u op 
[datum] een loonstrook heeft ingeleverd 
waaruit was op te maken dat u [datum] 
inkomsten uit arbeid ontving. De uitkering 
werd per [datum] beëindigd en het teveel 
genoten bedrag ad [bedrag] werd als 
vordering opgevoerd. In reactie verklaarde u 
[verklaring]. Deze verklaring was onvoldoende 
om het opleggen van de boete ad [bedrag] te 
voorkomen; medegedeeld per bestreden 
beschikking. Het op [datum] verlagen van de 
terugvordering tot [bedrag] leidde niet tot een 
verlaging van de boete. […] Het argument dat u 
uw contract pas eind [datum] heeft getekend, 
kan niet als reëel worden gezien […] Het 
argument, dat de originele salarisberekeningen 
tot en met [datum] eenmaal per kwartaal aan de 
werknemers werden verstrekt, zodat u ze niet 
eerder heeft kunnen afgeven, verliest zijn 
kracht […]. 
The person concerned has on the basis of article 
65 the legal duty, requested or of one’s own 
accord, to supply to Mayor and Aldermen all 
information of which he knows, or in fairness 
can know, that it matters for the right to 
welfare.  
Generally speaking it may be expected that is 
demonstrated that the supplied information is 
correct and complete. […] 
From the documents has become clear that you 
have submitted on [date] a pay slip from which 
could be deduced that you on [date] received 
earning form labor. The allowance was ended 
per [date] and the surplus of [sum] was 
claimed. In response you stated that 
[statement].  
This statement was insufficient to prevent the 
imposition of the fine of [sum]; notified 
through disputed decision.  
The on [date] reduction of the reclamation to 
[sum] did not lead to a reduction of the fine 
[…]  
The argument that you did not sign your 
contract until [date] can no be seen as 
reasonable. […]  
The argument that the original salary 
calculations were given to the employees once 
per quarter up and until [date], so that you 
could not deliver them earlier, looses its 
strength […] 
 
Et cetera, ending in a declaration that the objection is unfounded. Besides an illustration 
of the preferred order within the heart of the argumentation, the passage shows the 
systematic stylistics that cover the institutional agents of judgments, evaluations and 
interpretations (compare the bold expressions). The client however is explicitly staged. 
 
 
 
 
 5
PAUL VAN DEN HOVEN 
3. COMMUNICATIVE EFFICACY AND COMPREHENSIBILITY 
 
Not only law courts, but also semi-judicial instances adopt a text format as characterized 
above. Discussions with the actual writers make clear that these writers hardly reflect 
upon the fact that their text format is a specific choice out of many alternatives. That is 
remarkable, because alternative choices are more adequate to fulfill the stated goal of the 
text: to justify (or to explain) the decision taken vis-à-vis the society.  
Because the decisions are taken in a complex and formal environment and often 
on the basis of a quite sophisticated exchange of positions, comprehensibility for lay 
people is not obvious. If an alternative text format seems more appropriate to promote 
comprehensibility than the current one, we would expect these institutions to adopt such a 
format. Although this paper is not the place to argue this claim thoroughly, it may be 
plausible that a format that (a) starts with the decision, that (b) coherently organizes facts 
and rules in the form of complete arguments, and that (c) organizes the arguments in a 
logical discussion structure, serves the goal to reach an optimal comprehensibility more 
than the format actually used. Further (d) specific argumentative indicators should be 
used, including (e) clear indications of the discussion roles and of the responsibilities. On 
most relevant dimensions, such a format is the opposite of the format currently chosen. 
The format and stylistics chosen hinder non expert readers. In the macro structure 
the sections that separately present the ‘facts,’ the history and the legal framework are 
pointless for the reader. The argumentative relevance is missing. This is confirmed in 
fraternal discussions. Even among the specialists there is hardly ever a consensus about 
the adequacy and relevance of the stated facts and rules. The presentation order misses 
articulated argumentative relations. It therefore permits and even stimulates the strategy 
to include everything that might be relevant. 
An utterance becomes an argument in relation to a standpoint. Usually a 
standpoint is easily recognizable because it directly relates to the issue at hand. The 
opposite order is more difficult. It is hard to identify an utterance in it argument function 
as long as one has no clear idea yet of the (sub)standpoint that it supports. This implies 
that starting with the standpoint helps the reader to understand the functional 
argumentative relations while reading. A comprehensible justification is not served by 
presenting the reader the narrative of a (fictional) decision making process in stead of 
presenting the reader the decision taken followed by a justifying argumentation. 
 
4. THE SEMIOTICS OF THE FORMAT 
 
We observe a strong homogeneity in the text formats used. Further we see the use of a 
number of stylistic features, already noticed by Mellinkoff (1963), that are often 
criticized as unwelcome but seem to be ineradicable. Many of these features—
nominalizations, exuberant use of passives, strong preference for ‘objective’ 
connectives—have in common that they hide the voluntary acts of the agent, often the 
judge (Van den Hoven 1997). 
These features are consistent. They are recognizable in the European continental 
judicial tradition, but even in the judicial practices in Common Law areas, as Mellinkoff 
shows. As soon as western inspired legal systems develop, these features are found. They 
are deeply embedded in the legal practice. Although it proves to be possible to alter the 
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macro structure in semi judicial environments, the responses to a proposed change are 
revealing. Actual writers often state that a standpoint—argument order suggests partiality. 
If one continues questioning why, this often results in the remark that the current practice 
symbolizes impartiality. Many of the actual writers tend to say that the text format 
reflects the process of decision making. Confronted with the actual dynamics of the 
decision making process, this remark is often replaced by the claim that the format 
reflects the process of decision making as it  ‘theoretically’ or ‘ideally’  should go.  
One can observe that most of the professionals do not really reflect on the basic 
choices that they make in the presentation. In the institutions that we studied new 
employees learn the format by copying successful examples and by a master—mate 
system. A majority of the employees has a legal training and is therefore socialized in the 
format during the study. A strong factor to pass on the stylistic features on the micro level 
is also the form letter and form paragraph, available from databases on the intranet. So 
there are certainly many social, technological and practical factors that create the 
homogeneity, without a conscious, individual intention.  
The strategic meaning of the format is therefore a semiotic phenomenon as it is 
culturally embedded in the institutions as well as in the society. The format does carry a 
strong conventional meaning. The consistency as well as persistence of the format can be 
explained from the fact that it signifies the modernist ideology of legal decision making, 
in its macrostructure as well as in the stylistics on a micro level. The format (especially in 
the heart of the argumentation) is also very effective in covering up the moments that this 
ideology is unfeasible. This symbolic meaning is consistent with education, work 
procedures, expectations, tradition. Because of this institutional homogeneity the 
symbolic meaning seldom ‘reaches the surface.’  
The judicial and semi-judicial texts suggest that the process of decision-making is 
a logical deductive process, in which essentially the will and personality of the judge are 
not involved. This suggestion is signified by the narrative macro structure of the text that 
suggest that the judge first objectively meets the facts, is then confronted with the force of 
the appropriate rules of law and subsequently has to conclude according these facts and 
rules what the decision must be. In this narrative chain of motivated acts the driving force 
is not the judge (this agent is hidden by the linguistic means such as a very formal tone, 
use of passives, nominalizations, avoidance of the first person), but the facts, the rules 
and logic. 
This suggested formal rationality and objectivity is a myth. The decision-making 
process is in fact strongly determined by interpretation, sense of justice, intuitions and the 
exercise of will by the judge. This is argued convincingly by many theorists, for instance 
by Kelsen (Kelsen 1979, compare also Van den Hoven 1988). The Dutch legal scholar 
Nieuwenhuis formulates it very outspoken. He states that of course it is a naive fiction 
that it is the Law that decides, not the judge, but that this is no reason to give up this 
fiction in the judicial discourse, because the acceptance of the authority of the judge is 
served by this fiction (Nieuwenhuis 1995). Almost every legal theorist admits that the 
extreme form of the ideology as signified by the text format is incorrect. Judges (and 
semi judicial decision makers) create new meanings of the law and exercise their 
subjective will in the decision-making process. So the question is why the judicial and 
even the semi-judicial institutions sacrifice comprehensibility to conceal these voluntary 
and law-creating acts of the decision makers. 
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The explanation cannot be that of Nieuwenhuis as far as it suggests that judicial 
institutions intentionally cheat the community. The lack of reflection that we observed 
above already contradicts this. It must be that the semiotics of the text format reflects a 
concept of justice that still has a strong ideological topicality. The rhetoric of the format 
is an expression of the modernistic ideals on which a modern (Western) society is 
founded. It does not simply express that the judicial decision maker pretends that he 
maintains the modernistic ideology. It symbolizes that he is part of this ideology and 
works and thinks according to this ideology.  
Stephen Toulmin in his Cosmopolis (Toulmin 1990) situates the origins of the 
ideals of modernity in the period of the thirty-year war (1618-1648 AD). Modernity is 
connected with the ideals of the universal truth and values, associated with names as 
Spinoza, Newton and Descartes (compare also the magnificent work of Israel 2001). 
General principles do not only regulate the physical world, but also guide the normative 
reality. These principles may not be easily noticeable or discoverable by the human mind, 
but they are there. Therefore mankind has to be focused on these general principals and 
has to discover them. An orientation on a universal discourse can lay the basis for a 
general model of justice.  
This is the ideal of legality, connected with the value of legal security. The ideal is 
the construction of an explicit and coherent and consistent and complete system of 
general rules, established by a legitimated legislator, laid down in a written codex. 
According to this ideology, a legal decision is lawful if and only if it is the logical result 
of the application of the rules of law as meant by the legislator. A legal decision is 
righteousness and just if the decision is in harmony with that what the society experiences 
as just. Lawfulness and righteousness should coincide in a codified system of law. The 
modernistic view presupposes that mankind has the capacity to create, or better to 
discover this perfect theory of social justice, as well as to capture this theory in a general 
and internally consistent system. Or at least to work towards this ideal. This does not 
mean that there can and will never be a discrepancy between lawfulness and 
righteousness. But this is—still according to this modernistic ideology—a temporality. 
According to the doctrine of the separation of powers it is an exclusive privilege of the 
legislator to improve such an imperfection. Therefore, not the judge but the Law decides; 
the judge still is assumed to be the mouth of the legislator. 
This optimistic, simplified, reduced version of the modernistic ideal is symbolized 
by the text format and its stylistics. The rhetorical device shows that even though it is a 
theoretical consensus nowadays that the modernistic ideal is unattainable, it is still an 
ideal. Symbolically modernistic ideals still guide the process of the administration of 
justice in the modern society, as well as the process of legislation and the political 
process behind this legislation. The fact that it is clear that these ideals are not realized 
(and from a theoretical point of view cannot be realized) does not mean that society has 
given up this ideology, this myth. Post-modernism is a theoretical, academic exercise that 
may be convincing in many of its deconstructions. But that does not mean that its 
conclusions are reflected straightforward in a discursive practice. Argumentative 
discourse is an ideological sign too.  
 
         Link to commentary 
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